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I. INTRODUCTION
On the great expanses of the American West, the distribution of water
plays a pivotal role in defining the distribution of man. The use and
allocation of this limited resource breeds conflict. And in the wake of this
conflict, a considerable body of law has developed.
The arid western states are also characterized by large tracts of public
lands including public domain lands and federal reservations of American
Indian lands, refuges, parks, monuments, recreation areas, forest, range
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and wilderness lands.' On the arid western reservations, water acts as an
important land management tool. Yet Congress failed to include express
reservations of water to accompany the Executive's power to reserve lands.
Instead, courts have recognized the implied authority of the Executive to
reserve water for the purposes of the federal land reservation. This body of
judicial opinion constitutes the reserved water rights doctrine.
The most recent addition to the doctrine involves adjudication of
Colorado wilderness water rights in Sierra Club v. Block.2 The Block
opinion, however, ignores an important contradiction between the pur-
poses of the Wilderness Act of 1964(WA)3 and those in the Forest Service
Organic Act of 1897(FSO)' as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. New Mexico.' Yet, in drafting the WA, Congress relied upon the
compatibility between the purposes of the two acts. This comment
addresses the strength and validity of the legal analysis in Block and its
relation to New Mexico. For the sake of consistency in applying the law,
judges and legal scholars must recognize incompatible holdings within the
reserved water doctrine. The court in Block ignores an important contra-
diction between the WA and the FSO that calls into question the holding in
United States v. New Mexico.
II. HISTORY OF THE RESERVED WATER DOCTRINE
The United States Supreme Court first recognized impliedly reserved
water rights on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation of Montana in 1908.
In Winters v. United States,6 the Fort Belknap Indian Tribes sought to
protect waters present at the time of reservation from appropriation by
upstream users.7 The Tribes argued that they could not remain in one place
and practice the vocation intended by the government, irrigation farming,
without a reservation of water for that purpose.8 The Court acknowledged
that the land would have little value without adequate water supplies. 9 The
Court held that within the reservation of land, Congress implied the power
1. Public lands fall within two general categories, public domain lands and reserved lands. The
government may dispose of public domain lands because they are not held for any particular purpose.
Reserved lands, however, are those "expressly withdrawn from the public domain by statute, executive
order, or treaty, and are dedicated to a specific federal purpose." United States v. City and County of
Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1982).
2. 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), reh'g granted sub nom., Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp.
1490 (D. Colo. 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 44-48 and 63-66.
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 471-475, 478, 479-482, 551 (1982).
5. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
6. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
7. Id. at 565.
8. Id. at 576.
9. Id.
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to reserve water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation."
In 1955, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the authority of
the Executive to regulate the use and allocation of water on federal lands.
In Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon," the Court considered the Federal
Power Commission's approval of the Pelton Dam Project which included
an allocation of water from the reserved federal lands at the dam site. 2 The
State of Oregon contended that the Congressional Act of July 186613, the
Congressional Act of July 18701 and the Desert Lands Act'5 subjected the
appropriation and disposal of all water on federal lands to state water
laws.' 6 However, the Court held that these acts refer to water rights only on
"public lands", not those water rights implied for the management of
federal reservation lands.' 7 The Court distinguished domain lands, public
lands subject to private appropriation, from reserved lands, public lands
reserved for a federal purpose. Consequently, the federal government
retains the authority to regulate water on federal reserved lands because
these acts do not apply to federal land reservations. 8 Thus, the designation
of federal lands to a specific purpose gives rise to water rights distinct from
the state allocation systems governing public domain lands.
The federal reserved water doctrine lay dormant until 1963 when the
Supreme Court heard argument on the application of impliedly reserved
water rights to non-Indian federal lands. In Arizona v. California,'9 the
Court held that the same policy of reserving water for American Indian
reservations applied to all federal reservations. 20 The Court reasoned that
the federal government could claim state waters through the regulatory
powers of the Commerce 2' and Property22 clauses of the United States
Constitution.2"
In 1976, the reserved water doctrine grew to include the preservation
of groundwater levels. In Cappaert v. United States,24 use of groundwater
10. Id. The purposes of the Fort Belknap Reservation include a grant of the resources necessary
for irrigation farming. Foremost among these resources are arable land and water. Id.
11. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
12. Id. at 438.
13. ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (1866).
14. ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218 (1870).
15. ch. 235, § 1, 19 Stat. 377 (1877)(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1982)).
16. Federal Power Comm'n, 349 U.S. 446-47.
17. Id. at 448; See 16 U.S.C. § 796(l), (2) (1982) (codifying the distinction between public
domain and federal reservation lands as held in Federal Power Comm'n).
18. Federal Power Comm'n, 349 U.S. at 448.
19. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
20. Id. at 601.
21. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
22. Id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
23. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 597-98.
24. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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on the Cappaert ranch lowered the water levels in caves at the neighboring
Devil's Hole National Monument and threatened to destroy the scenic and
biologic resources that Congress intended the National Monument to
protect.2 5 The depletion of groundwater threatened the survival of a relic
population of diminutive and nearly blind pupfish.2 Nevertheless, the
United States Supreme Court recognized the Congressional directive to
preserve the fish and their habitat and extended the reasoning in Arizona to
reserve water from the public domain for the primary purposes of the
National Monument.27
This case established the federal power to extinguish water appropria-
tions junior to the date of the federal reservation. However, the Court
tempered this power by limiting the amount of reserved water to the
volume necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation." Therefore, the
purposes of the reservation define the amount of water available for
allocation by the land management agency.
A. United States v. New Mexico
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court refined the reserved water
doctrine by distinguishing primary purposes from secondary purposes in a
federal reservation. In United States v. New Mexico,29 the Court deter-
mined whether the Forest Service Organic Act(FSO)30 and the Multiple
Use and Sustained Yield Act(MUSY)31 reserved water for allocation by
the Forest Service for the management of Gila National Forest.32 The
United States Forest Service asserted reserved water rights for the forest
purposes of aesthetics, fish, wildlife and forest preservation as outlined in
MUSY.a3 The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the defendant's
allegation that the Forest Service could only reserve water on a national
forest for the primary purposes enumerated in the FSO 4
In New Mexico, the Court began its analysis by restating the core of
the reserved water doctrine: implied water rights on federal reservations
could extend only to the primary purposes of the reservation. 5 The Court
25. Id. at 133.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 143.
28. Id. at 141.
29. 438 U.S. 696 (1978), afflgMimbres Valleyv. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410,564 P.2d 615 (1977).
30. See supra note 4.
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982).
32. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713.
33. Id. at 704.
34. Mimbres Valley Irr. Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 412, 564 P.2d 615, 617 (1977).
35. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700. This rule, as formulated in Cappaert, stated that the purpose
of the reservation deserved the minimal amount of water necessary to accomplish that purpose.
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court modified the rule to allow reserved
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explained, "[wlhere water is only valuable for a secondary use of the
reservation, .... there arises a contrary inference that Congress in-
tended. . .that the U.S. would acquire water in the same manner as any
other public or private appropriation." 6 Consequently, the existence of
reserved water for the purposes of MUSY depended upon whether the
legislation created primary rather than secondary purposes .
The Court cited the purpose section of MUSY as indicating the
nature of the reservation."8 The MUSY purposes of outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed and wildlife protection must be supplemental to,
but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests were
established.3 9 In addition, the Court cited the House Report accompanying
the act which explains that the Executive may establish a forest for the
purposes contained in MUSY only if the Executive includes a purpose from
the FSO.40 MUSY purposes cannot stand alone; they must accompany one
of the original FSO purposes. This "supplemental" clause convinced the
Court that the MUSY purposes could only function subordinate to one of
the purposes of the FSO.4 1 Thus, the Court held that the Forest Service
must seek water for the secondary purposes of MUSY through the state's
prior appropriation system. 42
The Supreme Court proceeded to interpret the primary land use
purposes set forth in the FSO. The act provides:
No national forest shall be established, except to improve and
protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of
securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a
continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens
of the United States. .. .
In spite of the plain language of the FSO, the Court deferred to the
legislative history of the bill to define the primary purposes of federal forest
lands." The Court cited the legislative debates of the bill, administrative
regulations and subsequent legislation as supporting the interpretation
that the FSO contains the following purposes: 1) for securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and 2) for furnishing a continuous supply of
water only where the primary purpose of the reservation depended upon it to exist. New Mexico, 438
U.S. at 702.
36. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 713.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 528.
40. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714-15 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 4
(1960)).
41. Id. at 715.
42. Id.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 475.
44. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08.
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timber.45
The court's twofold interpretation required the following alteration of
the FSO: "No national forest shall be established, except to improve and
protect the forest; or in other words. . ".."I' This additional phrase
restricts the meaning of the words "to improve and protect the forest" to
the two purposes contained in the remainder of the sentence. The majority
supported this interpretation by noting that the organic acts of the
National Park Service and National Refuges expressly included the
purposes of preserving natural scenery, fish and wildlife.47 Had Congress
intended to provide for these purposes in the FSO, the Court concluded,
Congress would have expressly included them in the legislation.4
B. Sierra Club v. Block
1. Facts
On November 25, 1985, the Sierra Club brought suit against several
federal defendants49 to compel the Forest Service to assert impliedly
reserved water rights in Colorado's twenty-four wilderness areas for
adjudication within the state's water allocation system. 50 The Sierra Club
alleged that the Forest Service failed to adequately protect wilderness
water rights in violation of Wilderness Act"' and the public trust doc-
trine.52 Relying on the holding in New Mexico, the defendants contended
that the land use purposes of wilderness areas are secondary to the purposes
of the original national forest reservation. Consequently, implied water
rights on those lands extend only to the primary forest uses outlined in the
FSO.5 ' In Block, the District Court of Colorado primarily addressed
whether impliedly reserved water rights exist in wilderness areas.54
45. Id. at 707.
46. Id. at 707 n.14.
47. Id. at 709-Il.
48. Id. at 711.
49. The defendants included the Secretary of Agriculture, John Block, the Chief of the Forest
Service, Max Peterson; Secretary of the Interior, William Clark; and the Director of the National Park
Service, Russell Dickenson. Block, 622 F.Supp. at 845.
50. Id. at 846.
51. See supra note 3.
52. The public trust doctrine arises in the common law. The defendants argued that the Forest
Service had an obligation to assert reserved water rights as a trustee manager of public lands. The court
in Block dismissed this issue because the WA provides the basis for federal managerial obligations,
thus rendering any common law duties redundant. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 866.
53. Id. at 855.
54. The court also considered the issues of the Plaintiff's standing, and whether the court could
compel agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1982), and the
public trust doctrine. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 846-47.
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2. Wilderness Areas as Reservations
The existence of reserved water rights in Colorado wilderness areas
necessarily depends upon the resolution of two subissues: 1) whether the
WA reserves lands for specific purposes, and 2) whether Congress implied
a reserved water right to fulfill those purposes.55 In this endeavor, the court
in Block examined the unique problem of whether wilderness lands
withdrawn from an aggregate of land previously reserved for the purposes
of the FSO constituted a primary land reservation.
The court in Block distinguished the WA from land management
statutes such as MUSY where the purposes of a former reservation govern
those purposes of subsequent legislation. Although the Congress reserved
the wilderness lands in question from previously reserved forest lands, the
court found that these wilderness areas no longer share any of the use-
related purposes of the FSO.56 Instead, the court found that Congress
reclassified wilderness lands from their former designation as forest
lands. 57 "In preserving the natural state of the wilderness areas," the court
stated, "Congress prohibited or seriously limited most uses inconsistent
with the protection of the wilderness . -51 By the nature of the
restrictive purposes of the WA, the court held that the WA constitutes a
primary reservation of land.59
For instance, sections of the WA specifically withdraw wilderness
lands from use-related purposes.60 Furthermore, the legislative history of
the bill provides evidence to support the legal conclusion that the WA
creates a new and distinct reservation of public lands. The court noted that
the Supreme Court had previously observed legitimate primary reserva-
tions of land redesignated from land reserved for different purposes.61 With
these findings, the court in Block held that Congress reserved wilderness
lands with the intent that these lands receive the benefits of that
classification. 62
55. These were issues of first impression nationally in Block. Id. at 854.
56. Id. at 855-57.
57. Id. at 858.
58. Id. at 851.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 855-56. The court cited specifically 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(a) (purposes of preserva-
tion),(b) (retention of the primeval nature of the land), (c) (limiting commercial and use-related
purposes) and (d) (limiting grazing and water impoundment and prohibiting logging).
61. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 857 (citing Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (The Court
granted reserved water rights for the secondary withdrawal and reservation of both Lake Mead
National Recreation Area and Havasu National Wildlife Refuge).
62. Block, 622 F.Supp. at 858.
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3. The Purposes of the Wilderness Act
One benefit, the reservation of water to fulfill wilderness management
purposes, depends upon an implied reservation within the purposes of the
WA. 3 The explicit and lengthy policy statement of the WA enumerates
the express purposes of the WA. 4 The WA provides:
[Wilderness areas] shall be administered for the use and enjoy-
ment of the American people in such a manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as
to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of
their wilderness character .... 5
The essence of this purpose statement reduces neatly into the phrase,
"[wilderness areas are designated for the purpose of] preservation and
protection in their natural condition."6 In support, the court also cited
statements of several Congressmen stressing the importance of preserving
wilderness resources for future generations to enjoy. 7 Because these
purposes require water, the court held, the Executive may implement the
management of the land through a corresponding reservation of water.6 8
The court granted summary judgment on the issue of the existence of
wilderness water rights and compelled the Forest Service to submit a plan
outlining the management alternatives in protecting wilderness purposes
on Gila National Forest.6 9 However, the court could not order the Forest
Service to take specific action to protect WA purposes. As the court deftly
explained, the Forest Service may comply with its duty to protect
wilderness resources in many ways.70 The Forest Service may utilize
reserved water rights as one management tool among many to preserve the
natural integrity of the land. 1 Although the court found that the WA
reserves water rights to fulfill its purposes, the court yielded to the
discretion of the agency in complying with those purposes.7 1
In a rehearing of Block to review the court ordered forest plan, the
63. As the reserved water doctrine directs, a reserved water right arises only where Congress
expressed water dependant purposes in the reservation legislation. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702-03.
64. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 858.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
66. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 855 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (a)).
67. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 858-59. Rep. Libonati stated, "This act guarantees to this generation
and future generations of Americans the enduring resources of wilderness .. " 110 Cong. Rec.
17444 (statement of Rep. Libonati) (emphasis added by the court). See also, I 10 CoNG. Rac. 20602
(statement of Sen. Humphrey).
68. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862.
69. Id. at 865.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 863-65.
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court in Sierra Club v. Lyng7s assessed the viability of the alternatives set
forth by the Forest Service to comply with the purposes of the WA. The
court found the forest plan woefully inadequate." In dicta, the court stated
that the legislature must take action to clear the economic and philosophic
conflicts impeding the adjudication of wilderness water rights.75 This dicta
captures the heart of the contradiction between the Wilderness Act and the
Forest Service Organic Act. In essence, the policies of preservation and
development collide in the reserved water doctrine between the Block and
New Mexico cases.
III. ARGUMENT
A. The Contradiction within Block
1. Introduction to Argument
The court's call for a legislative policy statement in Lyng reflects the
continuing ambiguity surrounding wilderness water rights after the New
Mexico holding. In 1981, Waring and Samuelson wrote, "[m] any ambigu-
ities of the reserved water rights doctrine will not be settled until they arise
in litigation, thus creating the danger that conflicting decisions may be
handed down." ' Indeed, when following the course of reserved water
rights through Block, the ambiguous nature of wilderness water rights
creates a contradiction between the WA and the FSO which calls into
question the reasoning in New Mexico.
The express language of the WA presented a significant hurdle for the
court in Block. In the WA, Congress stated, "[n]othing in this chapter
shall be deemed to be in interference with the purposes for which the
national forests are established. . . . Congress further declared that
WA purposes "are within and supplemental to the purposes for which
national forests. . .are established and administered . .. . Through
this clause, Congress tied the purposes of the WA to those of the FSO. The
WA purposes must emanate from a purpose within the FSO. However, the
United States Supreme Court stated in New Mexico that Congress
reserved the national forests for the purposes of securing favorable
conditions for water flows and providing a continuous supply of timber.7 9 A
contradiction arises in the WA where Congress seemingly reserved lands
73. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (1987).
74. Id. at 1502.
75. Id.
76. Waring and Samuelson,Non-Indian Federal Reserved WaterRights, 58 DEN. L. J.783,799
(1981).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(1).
78. Id. at 1133(a).
79. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 706-07.
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for the purpose of preservation while stating that this purpose must
supplement the use-related purposes of the FSO. The court in Block
ignored this apparent contradiction.
A comparison of the purposes of the WA and the FSO has fostered
varying conclusions. In 1979, the Solicitor General stated that the
"supplemental" clause of the WA cannot be interpreted to limit the WA to
secondary uses reserving no water.80 One commentator declared that the
New Mexico holding should not pertain to wilderness reserved water
litigation.81 Several other commentators reached a similar conclusion
based on the definition of reserved water rights conceived in Cappaert and
repeated in New Mexico as follows: reserved water rights arise where the
very purpose of the reservation depends upon water to exist.8 However,
other commentators suggested that to put the preservation purposes of the
WA within the two purposes of the FSO essentially renders the WA
purposes subordinate to the FSO purposes.8 3 This conclusion echoes that
portion of the New Mexico opinion where the majority used the "supple-
mental" clause to support the holding that MUSY purposes are secondary
and reserve no additional water for the forest.8 4
The court in Block agreed with the Solicitor's Opinion regarding the
application of the primary purpose test of New Mexico to wilderness water
rights. The court stated that a failure to reserve water in wilderness areas
would entirely defeat the purposes of the WA.8 5 Accordingly, the court
held that, the WA reserves water to the extent necessary to accomplish its
purposes. 86
2. The WA and Providing a Continuous Supply of Timber
Although the court in Block found it difficult to conceive of wilderness
without reserved water, the WA directs that its purposes must lie within
80. Op. Solic. Dep't. of Interior, 86 1. D. 553,610 (1979). The Solicitor did not directly compare
the purposes of the WA and the FSO. The Solicitor did, however, refute the argument inferred from
New Mexico that the "supplemental" clause of the WA subordinates the purposes of the WA to those
purposes within the enacting legislation of the original federal reservation.
81. Abrams, Water in Western Wilderness Areas: The Duty to Assert Reserved Rights, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 393 (1986).
82. See Samuelson, Water Rightsfor Expanded Uses on Federal Reservations, 61 DEN. L.J.67
(1983). Samuelson agreed with the dissent in New Mexico that the denial of reserved water for MUSY
purposes(as secondary uses) amounts to inconsequential dicta. Id. at 75-76. See also, Comment,
Federal Reserved Water Rights in National Forest Wilderness Areas, 21 LAND AND WATER L. REV.
381,390 (1986). The author argued that courts should limit the scope of New Mexico from wilderness
issues.
83. Waring and Samuelson, supra note 76, at 792.
84. Id.
85. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862.
86. Id.
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the accepted interpretation of FSO purposes.8 7 The United States Su-
preme Court, however, did not interpret the FSO purpose clause until
fourteen years after the passage of the WA. Inescapably, the WA purposes
of preserving lands in their natural state cannot arise within the strict
interpretation of FSO purposes given in New Mexico. This conflict clearly
emerges in Block by the court's comparison of WA purposes with the
purpose of providing a continuous supply of timber.
The court in Block dealt with this apparent contradiction of purposes
summarily. The comparison of preservation with the harvest of timber
merited only a footnote to the effect that a comparison was meaningless. 88
The court reasoned that although timber harvesting contravenes the WA
purposes, lands proposed for wilderness designation in 1964 had no
immediate timber producing value. Therefore their loss from production
would not remarkably affect timber production.89 The court in Block
concluded, "It is clear that Congress was not referring to the purpose of
providing a continuous supply of timber."90 Thus, the court held that WA
purposes need not supplement the harvest of timber.
This circuitous conclusion, however, does not flatter the vision of
Congress. The court supported its reasoning with evidence that Congress
had no immediate interest in the timber production on proposed wilderness
lands in 1963.91 However, modern logging techniques coupled with
increased demand for federally subsidized timber harvesting may make
wilderness and proposed wilderness lands attractive to the timber industry.
Courts have enjoined logging in wilderness study areas on the grounds that
this FSO purpose would destroy the value of the land as wilderness.92 In
addition, the court's reasoning in Block ignores the present and future
designation of wilderness in premier timber producing old growth forests.
Meanwhile, with increasing demands for wilderness designation, the
potential conflict between these mutually exclusive resource uses
increases.
The effects and methods of commercial logging inherently destroy the
land's wilderness qualities. Clearcuts, terracing, replanting, herbicide
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a).
88. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 866 n. 13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.;SeeS. R. REP. No. 109,88thCong. lstSess. at 4(1963). TheSenatestated, "There is no
timber harvest today from the lands being considered for inclusion in the wilderness system ... "
92. See, e.g., California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit found the
RARE I I environmental impact statement deficient, and therefore, void. To preserve the status quo on
wilderness study lands until the Forest Service prepared an adequate EIS, the court enjoined
wilderness disturbing activities including logging on lands released from wilderness designation under
RARE 11. See also City ofTenakeev. Block, 778 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1985)(reaffirming the holding in
California v. Block with regard to logging activities on wilderness study lands).
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application and road building radically alter the composition and regener-
ation of the forest ecosystem.9" Furthermore, the mechanized nature of
timber extraction disrupts the established distribution of local and migra-
tory wildlife and creates significant damage to waterways through silta-
tion.94 On this issue, the court in Block discretely stated that the
contradiction between wilderness and logging will never arise because
these uses do not coincide.95 This statement simply ignores a contradiction
not easily surmounted.
3. The WA and Favorable Conditions for Water Flows
With respect to securing favorable conditions for water flows, the
court in Block found that the WA and the FSO purposes coincide. 96 The
court cited legislative history replete with rhetoric praising the WA
purposes as beneficial to the protection of watercourses for supplying
downstream appropriators with high-quality water.97 The court held that
non-consumptive water reservations would supplement the quantity and
quality of water available to downstream appropriators.98 Therefore,
reservation of high alpine waters could not affect the forest purpose of
securing favorable conditions for water flows.99
This statement requires an unrealistically narrow interpretation of
the phrase, securing favorable conditions for water flows. If this phrase
contains only the restricted purpose of benefitting downstream appropria-
tors in the same drainage, then the court in Block held correctly that the
WA supplements this purpose; for preserving water in wilderness water-
sheds naturally supplements the purpose of providing water for down-
stream appropriators. This narrow interpretation, however, fails to capture
the nature of the modern water project.
The Forest Service has interpreted this phrase, securing favorable
conditions for waterflows, to include the exportation of water to entirely
93. A. BOLLE, A UNIVERSITY VIEW OFTHE FORESTSERVICE, S. Doc. No. 91-115 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 14-16 (1970). The University of Montana Dean of Forestry and a number of forestry scientists
commented on the timber harvesting practices in the Bitterroot Valley of Montana. The report
considered environmental, aesthetic and societal aspects of clearcutting timber management.
94. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc. v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 587-88 (9th
Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988).
95. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 860 n. 13.
96. Id. at 860.
97. Id. In one case, Congressman Riehlman flatly stated that the WA purposes will not only
enhance water quality, they would not conflict with FSO purposes. 110 CONG. REC. 17437 (statement
of Rep. Reihlman). See also, 110 CONG. REC. 17442 (statement of Rep. Olsen) (non-consumptive uses
on wilderness lands), 110 CONG. REc. 5895 (statement of Sen. Church) (protection of wilderness
watersheds).
98. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 859.
99. Id. at 859-60.
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different drainages. The Owens Valley Project of California, ambitious in
its own day, serves as a example of what securing favorable conditions for
water flows may mean. The project involved the construction of the historic
aqueduct providing Los Angeles with much needed water from the distant
Owens Valley. The aquaduct secured the water flows of the Owens Valley
not for downstream appropriators in the valley, but for a city 250 miles
distant in another drainage.100 The upper Owens Valley was designated as
Inyo National Forest for the very purpose of securing favorable conditions
for waterflows to Los Angeles.' 0'
Yet the Owens Valley Project represents but one example among
many projects and plans to secure favorable conditions for water flows to
entirely different drainages. 02 As one scholar suggests, the diversion and
storage of water in alpine wilderness lands becomes economically feasible
as demand for water rises.'03 This demand, as evidenced by the Owens
Valley Project and many other diversion schemes, may arise in highly
developed areas far removed from the source of diversion.
In short, the WA purposes prescribe a natural flow of water within
streams and rivers to sustain the flora and fauna of the wilderness. The
court in New Mexico, however, struck down any purpose in the FSO
prescribing instream flows of reserved water. 04 This interpretation of the
FSO may allow the Forest Service to manage a forest expressly for the
purpose of removing water. A wilderness area with substantial water needs
for instream flows cannot be found within a forest purpose to export water
elsewhere.
Even in the face of this contradiction between the purposes of the WA
and the FSO, the WA must reserve water. The court in Block stated, "[i]t
is beyond cavil that water is the lifeblood of wilderness. . .[for] without
access to the requisite water, the very purposes for which the [WA] was
established would be entirely defeated."' 0 5 This statement of the necessity
of water for reservation purposes provides the basis for all reserved water
rights. It is indisputable and repeated throughout the reserved water
doctrine. 06
100. M. REISNER, THE CADILLAC DESERT 63-64 (1987).
101. Id. at 86. As the author points out, the Inyo National Forest, as enacted in 1907, contained
no timber worth harvesting. Id. at 87.
102. See Id. at 506-14. Reisner examines numerous plans and installations removing water from
one drainage to an entirely different area. The North American Water and Power Alliance, a major
interbasin diversion plan, would diert waters from Canada, Washington and Oregon to Southern
California and Arizona affecting the flow of nearly every major drainage on the western seaboard.
103. Abrams, supra note 81, at 390.
104. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705.
105. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862.
106. See text accompanying supra note 35.
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B. Dissolving the Contradiction between the WA and the FSO
1. Introduction
In New Mexico, the United States Supreme Court gave a restricted
interpretation of the FSO purposes that inadvertently alienates the
purposes of the WA. In many instances, the purpose of preservation cannot
supplement the purposes of providing timber or securing favorable
conditions for water flows. The conflict between the purposes of the WA
and the FSO suggest two possible results. One, that Congress did not
intend to give effect to the "supplemental" clause of the WA; or two, that
the Supreme Court misinterpreted the purpose clause of the FSO.
As the dicta in New Mexico reveals, the United States Supreme Court
predicated its holding on the concern to preserve state control over water
allocation.0 7 In New Mexico, the Forest Service sought a reserved water
right on the fully appropriated Rio Mimbres. The resulting loss of water to
private and state appropriations, the Court stated, could not have escaped
the attention of Congress. 10 8 Trelease echoed this concern when he stated
that an expanded reserved water doctrine may damage state systems of
water allocation. 09 A third forest purpose would give rise to a relatively
unquantified reserved water right which could confound state determina-
tion of the amounts of water available for beneficial use. 10
Consequently, the New Mexico holding reduced the likelihood of
uncertainty in state water regulation by restricting the purposes of the
FSO. But the New Mexico holding failed to consider the impact of this
restriction on reserved water rights in wilderness areas. This interpretation
of the purposes of the FSO has cast a cloud on the discovery and
quantification of reserved water rights in wilderness areas.
2. Harmonizing the FSO with the WA
The "supplementary clause" of the WA indicates that, in 1964,
Congress interpreted the FSO to include a purpose that could provide the
foundation for the expansive purposes of the WA. The Court in New
Mexico failed to consider the implicit interpretation of the FSO contained
in the WA. To harmonize the FSO with the WA as originally intended by
Congress, the purpose statement of the FSO must include a separate
purpose to "improve and protect the forest". The remaining purposes
acknowledged in New Mexico, for "providing a continuous supply of
107. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701-05.
108. Id. at 705.
109. F. Trelease, Uneasy Federalism:State Water and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. Rv.
751, 757 (1980).
110. Id. at 751-66.
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timber" and "securing favorable conditions for water flows", serve to
modify the ignored purpose, not conceal it. The dissent in New Mexico
admonished the Court for this oversight and stated that this phrase
includes a basic purpose of protecting and improving the forest as an
ecosystem.111
If the FSO has a general preservation purpose as the dissent
perceived, then the preservation purposes of the WA would logically
supplement, but not derogate the FSO. Wilderness designations give
protection to the entire forest ecosystem distinct from the provisions for
supplying timber or securing favorable conditions for water flows. The
"supplemental" clause, then, provides evidence that Congress interpreted
the FSO in 1964 more broadly than did the Supreme Court in 1978.
Several commentators support this threefold interpretation of the
FSO with a number of persuasive arguments. The plain meaning of the
FSO purpose clause clearly establishes three purposes.1  Following the
conventions of the construction of unambiguous statutory language, the
FSO provides for improvement and protection of the forest as an ulterior
purpose in the designation and management of forests.' With the three
purposes of the FSO contained in one sentence, each carries weight in the
management criteria imposed upon the Forest Service. 114 The Supreme
Court ignored this plain meaning interpretation for a more restricted
interpretation supported by selected portions of legislative and western
history.115
The legislative and general history surrounding the passage of the
FSO, however, also point to a threefold purpose clause." 6 The interpreta-
tion of the FSO purpose clause in New Mexico appears to align closely to an
interpretation of the purposes of the original Organic Act of 1891 " by the
Division of Forestry. 1 8 In 1897, however, Congress redrafted the Act to
include the phrase "to improve and protect the forest." 1 9 This phrase
111. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 723-24 (Powell, J. dissenting).
112. J. Elliot, Unites States v. New Mexico: Purposes That Hold No Water, 22 ARM. L. REV.
19, 29-30 (1980).
113. Id. at 36.
114. Id. at 37.
115. Id.
116. S. Fairfax and A. Tarlock, No Waterfor the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United Stated
v. New Mexico, 15 ID. L. REV. 509, 533, 549 (1979). The authors came to a different conclusion than
the Court in New Mexico regarding the interpretive uses of legislative history of the FSO and general
history at that time. They concluded that the Congressional debates and contemporary historians, such
as G. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1864) and S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY (1869), all clearly evince a tension between use and preservation on the forests.
117. ActofMar.3,1891,ch.561,24Stat. 1103 (1891)(repealed by 16U.S.C. §471 (a) (1976)).
118. DIVISION OF FORESTRY, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE
DIVISION OF FORESTRY FOR 1891, at 233-55.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1982).
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accurately reflects the contemporary tension between development and
preservation described by Marsh and Hays.120 Therefore, even the basis for
the New Mexico holding rests on an uncertain foundation.
3. Subsequent Legislation as an Aid to Interpretation
In New Mexico, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the discovery
of Congressional intent to delineate the purposes of the FSO. The Court
cited several examples of post-FSO legislation that specifically included
water related purposes. 2 The FSO, however, includes no specific water
reservation relating to the protection of the forest. By inverse logic, the
Court held that Congress did not intend to reserve water for any
unspecified duties in the protection of the forest. The Court reasoned that
Congress intended water reservations only where legislation contains
express purposes to override the general rule of express deference to state
water appropriation systems.1 2 The Court, however, failed to look to the
comprehensive body of subsequent legislation to interpret the meaning of
the original statute.
In addition to the WA, other Congressional acts subsequent to the
FSO reflect a threefold interpretation of the FSO purpose clause. For
instance, the Weeks Act 23 of 1924 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to
evaluate the management of activities on the forests and instigate new
programs to protect the forest purposes. The Weeks Act further provided
that the Secretary of Agriculture shall recommend systems of fire
prevention and systems to protect the forest, watershed and the continuous
supply of timber. 24 Although the Weeks Act fell within the era of intensive
timber management and resource use on the forests, this legislation clearly
enumerates three purposes derived from the FSO. 12 5
Further, MUSY may also be interpreted to incorporate a three
purpose interpretation of the FSO. 2 8 Many of the myriad purposes found
120. Fairfax and Tarlock, supra note 116, at 548-50.
121. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 709-11. The Court compared the purpose statement of the FSO
with the express purposes of the National Parks and National Wildlife Refuges. In Parks and Refuges,
Congress explicitly provided for the protection of fish and wildlife. The FSO makes no mention of these
resources. Hence, the Court concluded that the clause "to improve and protect the forest" carries no
broad protection for the forest's flora and fauna beyond the provision for timber.
122. Id. at 715.
123. Weeks Law of July 1, 1924, 43 Stat. 653 (repealed by 16 U.S.C. §§ 564, 565 (1982)).
124. Id. at 653.
125. Id. at 653-54. In the eyes of many historians, the era of intensive timber management began
with the passage of the Transfer Act in 1905, ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628(1905)(codified as amended 16
U.S.C. § 472 (1982). In 1924, well within this era of intensive resource use, Congress passed the Weeks
Act. Although the Act clearly emphasizes the forest uses of timber and watershed management,
protection of the forest remained the first use from which the remaining two could spring.
126. R. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal
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in MUSY naturally emanate from protection and improvement of the
forest. In this light, MUSY codified many of the Forest Service policies
that supplement the improvement and protection of the forest. 117 Exam-
ples include aesthetics, non-destructive recreation, and fish and wildlife
preservation. Once again, these MUSY purposes supplement the protec-
tion of the forest while they may conflict with the purposes of providing
timber and securing favorable conditions for water flows.1 28 The Supreme
Court ignored this evidence in the interpretation of the FSO.
As extrinsic aids of statutory construction, the Weeks Act, the WA
and MUSY all provide evidence that Congress intended three purposes in
the management of the national forests. A court may decide not to weigh
evidence of Congressional intent through subsequent legislation in statu-
tory interpretation. However, case law has established that where Con-
gress amends or clarifies a statute by subsequent legislation, the latter
legislation provides strong evidence of the legislative intent in the first
statute.1 29 Furthermore, where latter legislation depends in part upon the
reference to and interpretation of a former statute, the Congress intended a
continuity of interpretation between the statutes. 130 Continuity between
the WA and the FSO relies upon a forest purpose to improve and protect
the forest.
IV. REWRITING BLOCK
Sierra v. Block ignores any conflict between the WA and New
Mexico. Ignoring the conflict exposes an Achilles heel in the Block
reasoning. Waring and Samuelson argue that the conflicting purposes of
the WA and the FSO require the subordination of WA to the classification
of a secondary withdrawal of forest lands.13' This argument correctly
illuminates the conflict, but it fails to account for Congress' intent to
reserve water essential for the purposes of wilderness. The strength and
cohesiveness of the reserved water doctrine depends upon the recognition
of this conflict in the legal reasoning surrounding the existence of
wilderness reserved water rights.
To dispel the confusion surrounding the effect of New Mexico upon
the WA, further adjudication of wilderness reserved water rights should
delineate this contradiction of purposes. While the Supreme Court's
Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136-37 n. 173 (1978).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4-7 (1960). The House Report states in
part that the Forest Services' authority to administer forest lands for recreation and wildlife purposes
arises within the FSO.
128. Id.
129. 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 51.01 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1984).
130. Id. § 51.02.
131. Waring and Samuelson, supra note 76, at 792.
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twofold interpretation of the FSO conflicts with WA purposes, New
Mexico contains elements of the reserved water doctrine that support the
holding in Block. Namely, a reserved water right arises where the purposes
of a reservation depend upon water to exist. 132 Wilderness, by definition,
cannot exist without natural supplies of water. Therefore, the New Mexico
holding, in part, would support a wilderness reserved water right. To attain
consistency in the application of the reserved water doctrine, the Congress
or the Supreme Court must resolve this conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
The muddying of reserved waters began in New Mexico with the
adjudication of national forest reserved water rights and continues with the
current adjudication of wilderness reserved water rights in Block. In New
Mexico, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "to improve and protect
the forest" had no substantive effect upon the management of the forests.
Therefore the Court held that this statement could not reserve water for the
improvement and protection of the forest. But clearly, the WA indicates
that Congress intended to create a forest purpose "to improve and protect
the forest." Without a three purpose interpretation of the FSO, the WA
appears to contradict the purposes of the FSO.
This apparent conflict between the WA and the FSO arises in Sierra
Club v. Block. However, in adjudicating Colorado's wilderness water
rights, the conflict escapes the court. On appeal or in another jurisdiction,
the court must acknowledge that the New Mexico decision runs counter to
the purpose for designating wilderness. Only through a careful delineation
of the problem can Congress or the Supreme Court decide which will yield,
the New Mexico holding or wilderness water rights. Should the legislature
or the judiciary decide to overrule New Mexico, the adjudication of
wilderness water rights will have far-ranging impacts on both wilderness
and forest lands. And only then will reserved waters run clear.
132. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
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